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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 This case requires us to determine whether the First 
Amendment permits a court, acting pursuant to the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA),1 to restrain a grand jury witness 
from disclosing its receipt of service to a third party.  A grand 
jury issued a subpoena to ABC Corp.,2 an electronic service 
provider, for the data of one of its customer’s employees who 
was under criminal investigation.  A search warrant later 
demanded additional data regarding the same subscriber.  
These requests were accompanied by nondisclosure orders 
(NDOs) prohibiting ABC Corp. from notifying anyone of the 
existence of the data requests.  ABC Corp. complied with both 
requests but challenges the constitutionality of the NDOs, 
arguing that they infringe upon its freedom of speech.  ABC 
Corp. asks to amend the NDOs to permit disclosure to an 
individual who, it argues, poses no risk to the grand jury 
investigation.  We must determine whether the First 
Amendment tolerates such a restraint on speech.   
 
Our conclusion, which we explain below, is that the 
governmental interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy is 
sufficiently strong for the NDOs to withstand strict scrutiny.  
Disclosure to anyone outside of the grand jury process would 
undermine the proper functioning of our criminal justice 
system.  We will affirm the District Court’s denial of ABC 
Corp.’s motion to amend the NDOs.   
                                              
1 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. 
2 To maintain the secrecy of the investigation, we will refer to 
the facts in general terms and will use for the corporation the 
fictitious name of “ABC Corp.” 
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I.  Background 
A.  Statutory Background 
The Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA) is 
“designed to protect legitimate law enforcement needs while 
minimizing intrusions on the privacy of system users as well 
as the business needs of electronic communications system 
providers.”3  The SCA authorizes the government to compel 
an electronic service provider to produce a subscriber’s 
information stored on remote servers, often referred to as “the 
cloud.”4  The advent of cloud computing has altered how the 
government obtains information during criminal 
investigations.5  Where information was previously sought by 
directly approaching the target of the investigation or his 
employer, the SCA permits prosecutors to obtain the data from 
electronic service providers.6   
 
Section 2703 of the SCA allows the government to 
obtain search warrants, court orders, or subpoenas for a 
subscriber’s data.  These requests may be for non-content-
specific data,7 such as name, address, and product-usage 
information, or content-specific data,8 including the contents 
of all communications, search histories, and saved files.  A 
                                              
3 132 Cong. Rec. 27633 (1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
4 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Seeking Enterprise Customer Data 
Held by Cloud Service Providers, at 1 (Dec. 2017). 
5 Id.   
6 Id.   
7 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
8 Id. § 2703(a), (b). 
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service provider who turns over this information in response to 
a grand jury subpoena, as is the case here, is a grand jury 
witness and is not subject to the general secrecy obligation 
imposed by the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2).9  
However, the SCA authorizes courts to prohibit a service 
provider from notifying anyone of its receipt of legal process 
in appropriate circumstances.10   
 
We have not had the opportunity to analyze the SCA’s 
nondisclosure provision.11  Section 2705(b) governs those 
occasions when the government may request that a court issue 
an NDO to service providers.  That provision, in relevant part, 
states: 
 
Preclusion of notice to subject of 
governmental access.  A 
governmental entity acting under 
section 2703, when it is not 
required to notify the subscriber or 
customer under section 
2703(b)(1), or to the extent that it 
may delay such notice pursuant to 
subsection (a) of this section, may 
                                              
9 Notes of Advisory Committee, Note to Subdivision (e)(2); 
see also United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 
(1983) (“[Grand jury w]itnesses are not under the prohibition 
unless they also happen to fit into one of the enumerated 
classes [listed in the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6(e)(2)].”). 
10 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
11 We thank the parties for their additional late-hour briefing 
on this issue. 
5 
 
apply to a court for an order 
commanding a provider of 
electronic communications service 
or remote computing service to 
whom a warrant, subpoena, or 
court order is directed, for such 
period as the court deems 
appropriate, not to notify any other 
person of the existence of the 
warrant, subpoena, or court 
order.12 
The SCA thus permits the government to apply for an NDO 
when it seeks content or non-content data pursuant to § 2703 
unless the government itself is required to notify the subscriber 
of the request.13  Even when the government must notify the 
subscriber, it may still obtain an NDO if it may delay 
notification pursuant to § 2705(a).  A court shall issue an NDO 
if it finds reason to believe that disclosure will result in “(1) 
endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (2) 
flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of or tampering with 
evidence; (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (5) 
otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly 
delaying a trial.”14  When these risks are present, an NDO 
prohibits an electronic service provider from disclosing the 
government’s request for data for up to one year.15 
                                              
12 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
13 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B). 
14 Id. § 2705(b). 
15 Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Policy Regarding Applications 
for Protective Orders Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), at 2 
(Oct. 19, 2017). 
6 
 
 
B.  Factual and Procedural Background 
ABC Corp. is an electronic service provider that stores 
its subscribers’ content and non-content data on the cloud.  In 
January 2019, ABC Corp. received a grand jury subpoena 
issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2), ordering it to produce 
the data of one of its subscribers, concerning an employee of 
the subscriber.  This employee is the target of an ongoing 
criminal investigation.  The subpoena sought non-content-
specific information, including, inter alia, records of names, 
physical addresses, billing information, and IP addresses 
associated with the employee’s account.  The subpoena was 
accompanied by an NDO, prohibiting for one year ABC Corp. 
from notifying any person, except ABC Corp.’s own lawyers, 
of the existence of the subpoena.  Two months later, a 
Magistrate Judge issued a search warrant directing ABC Corp. 
to produce content-specific data for the same account.  The 
warrant sought all evidence found in the employee’s remotely 
stored data pertaining to several enumerated offenses being 
investigated by the government.  The search warrant was 
accompanied by a second NDO, virtually identical to the first.  
ABC Corp. complied with both the subpoena and search 
warrant.  The subscriber subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and 
a trustee has been appointed.   
 
ABC Corp. moved before the District Court to modify 
the NDOs to permit it to notify the bankruptcy trustee of the 
existence of the subpoena and warrant, arguing that the NDOs 
are content-based restrictions and prior restraints that infringe 
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upon its First Amendment rights.16  ABC Corp. asserted that it 
was proposing a less restrictive alternative to the content-based 
restriction.  ABC Corp. argued that the trustee is a disinterested 
party, who had stepped into the shoes of the debtor and had 
been vetted and approved under Department of Justice 
guidelines.  Further, ABC Corp. claimed that the trustee 
controlled the debtor’s assertion of attorney-client privilege, 
had authority to respond to the government’s demands, and had 
a duty to uncover and assert causes of action against the 
debtor’s officers and directors.  ABC Corp. proposed two 
alternatives, both involving disclosure of the grand jury 
investigation to the bankruptcy trustee with varying levels of 
specificity.   
 
The District Court denied the motion to amend the 
NDOs.  It found that § 2705(b) implicates the First 
Amendment rights of service providers and, without 
determining whether strict scrutiny applies, held that such an 
NDO passes strict scrutiny regardless.  In its analysis, the court 
found that the NDOs serve the compelling governmental 
interest of “maintain[ing] the secrecy of the ongoing grand jury 
investigation and meet[ing] several of the requirements under 
                                              
16 The Government argues that ABC Corp. never moved to 
modify the search warrant NDO.  However, ABC Corp. plainly 
raised the issue in its memorandum in support of its motion to 
modify and raised it again to this Court.  Moreover, the 
Government argued against modification to both NDOs before 
the District Court, and the District Court referenced ABC 
Corp.’s request for relief from the search warrant NDO in its 
memorandum opinion.  We will consider ABC Corp.’s 
challenge to both NDOs. 
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§ 2705(b).”17  Next, the court determined that the NDOs are 
narrowly tailored because the restriction on ABC Corp.’s 
speech is time-limited to one year.  Moreover, ABC Corp. had 
failed to establish that the trustee had “any particularized need 
to the grand jury subpoena or any additional information 
regarding same.”18  Finally, the court held that the NDOs are 
the least restrictive means for advancing the government’s 
interest.  It rejected ABC Corp.’s proposed alternatives 
because they were impractical, less effective than the NDO, 
and risked further disclosure to third parties. 
 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  Although both parties argue in favor of our 
exercising jurisdiction, we have “an independent duty to satisfy 
ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction regardless of the parties’ 
positions.”19  Our jurisdiction flows from the collateral order 
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.20  Under the collateral order 
doctrine, an otherwise non-final order is appealable if it “[1] 
finally and conclusively determines the disputed question, [2] 
resolves an important issue separate from the underlying 
merits, and [3] is effectively unreviewable after final 
judgment.”21  Here, the District Court’s order finally and 
                                              
17 JA9. 
18 JA6. 
19 Bedrosian v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, IRS, 912 F.3d 144, 149 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
20 United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2001). 
21 Id. at 87. 
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conclusively rejected ABC Corp.’s First Amendment 
challenge to the NDO.  Second, the order resolved an important 
issue:  balancing a burden on speech against a court’s power to 
manage grand jury proceedings.  The order is also entirely 
divorced from the merits of the grand jury proceeding and 
concerns ABC Corp.’s rights, not the rights of the grand jury 
target.22  Third, the NDOs will be effectively unreviewable if 
or when the target is prosecuted.  Because all three criteria of 
the collateral order doctrine are met, we have appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 
We exercise plenary review over questions of law.23  
Although normal deference to a district court’s factual findings 
would necessitate clear error review, “in the First Amendment 
context we have an ‘obligation independently to examine the 
whole record to ensure that the judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’”24 
  
                                              
22 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 398 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
23 United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
24 Id. (quoting Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 91). 
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B.  Content-Based Restrictions and Prior Restraint 
Nondisclosure orders implicate First Amendment rights 
because they restrict a service provider’s speech.25  Courts 
apply varying levels of scrutiny to incursions on speech 
depending on whether the restriction is content based or 
content neutral.26  Content-based laws are presumptively 
unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny.27  In contrast, 
intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions.28  
Government regulation of speech is content based if it “applies 
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea 
or message expressed.”29  The NDOs in this case are content 
based because they prohibit ABC Corp. from conveying 
information about a grand jury investigation, thus “draw[ing] 
distinctions based on the message.”30   
 
The government’s use of NDOs also constitutes prior 
restraint, a characterization typically used to describe “judicial 
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in 
advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”31  
Indeed, the NDOs forbid ABC Corp. from speaking about its 
participation as a grand jury witness.  “[P]rior restraints on 
speech . . . are the most serious and the least tolerable 
                                              
25 See Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 92. 
26 Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 941 F.3d 73, 84 (3d Cir. 2019). 
27 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
28 Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 363-64 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
29 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
30 Id. 
31 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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infringement on First Amendment rights.”32  While prior 
restraints “are not unconstitutional per se,”33 they are 
presumptively unconstitutional34 and subject to strict 
scrutiny.35   
 
The government asks us to apply intermediate scrutiny, 
essentially carving out a new area for prior restraints involving 
speech about non-public proceedings.  Relying on Seattle 
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 36  the government argues that the 
restraint on ABC Corp.’s speech is not the kind of classic prior 
restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny.  In 
Seattle Times, the Supreme Court declined to apply heightened 
scrutiny to a protective order limiting a civil litigant’s ability 
to disseminate for its own benefit embarrassing information 
discovered in advance of trial.37  But ABC Corp. is in quite a 
different position as a grand jury witness, and it harbors no 
abusive motives.  ABC Corp. insists that it only wishes to 
disclose its receipt of service to alert an individual who can 
assert its subscriber’s rights.  Moreover, the Seattle Times 
language on which the government relies is derived from 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. 
                                              
32 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
33 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). 
34 First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 
784 F.2d 467, 477 (3d Cir. 1986). 
35 Stilp v. Contino, 613 F.3d 405, 415 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[P]rohibit[ing] public disclosure of the fact that an Ethics Act 
complaint was filed, does not survive strict scrutiny and cannot 
be enforced.”). 
36 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984). 
37 Id. at 34. 
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DePasquale, a right of access case.38  The right of access does 
not enjoy the broad protections offered to the right of free 
speech.39  In fact, Justice Powell’s concurrence contrasted the 
right of access with a gag order, describing the latter as “a 
classic prior restraint” and “one of the most extraordinary 
remedies known to our jurisprudence.”40  We do not find 
Seattle Times instructive under these circumstances. 
 
We thus reject the government’s invitation to apply a 
lesser degree of scrutiny.  Because the NDOs are content-based 
restrictions and presumptively unconstitutional prior restraints, 
we apply strict scrutiny to determine whether they are 
constitutionally infirm. 
 
C.  Strict Scrutiny 
The government has the burden to establish that the 
NDOs survive strict scrutiny.41  Strict scrutiny requires the 
government to demonstrate that the restriction on speech “(1) 
serve[s] a compelling governmental interest; (2) [is] narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) [is] the least restrictive 
means of advancing that interest.”42  “The purpose of the [strict 
scrutiny] test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further 
                                              
38 Id. at 33-34 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 399 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
39 First Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 477; Stilp, 613 F.3d at 
413. 
40 Gannet Co., 443 U.S. at 399 (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n., 427 
U.S. at 562). 
41 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). 
42 Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 286 (quoting ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 
F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
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than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure 
that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.”43   
 
1.  The Restriction on Speech Serves a Compelling 
Governmental Interest. 
In reference to the application of strict scrutiny here, the 
government argues that it has a compelling interest in 
preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.  But strict 
scrutiny sets a high bar for the government to meet.  
“[Government] officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need to further a 
[governmental] interest of the highest order.”44  We are 
convinced, however, that protecting the secrecy of an 
investigation is a paramount interest of the government.45  The 
government’s interest is particularly acute where, as here, the 
investigation is ongoing.46   
 
Moreover, § 2705(b) sets out for us the governmental 
interests that must exist before a court issues an NDO.  Here, 
the District Court and Magistrate Judge found reason to believe 
that notification would “seriously jeopardize the investigation 
                                              
43 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666. 
44 Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (quoting 
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). 
45 See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 
211, 218 (1979) (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand jury 
system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”). 
46 See id. at 222 (“[T]he interests in grand jury secrecy, 
although reduced, are not eliminated merely because the grand 
jury has ended its activities.”). 
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. . . by giving targets an opportunity to flee or continue flight 
from prosecution, destroy or tamper with evidence, change 
patterns of behavior, or notify confederates.”47  In denying 
ABC Corp.’s motion to amend, the District Court found that 
the NDOs serve a compelling governmental interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of the ongoing grand jury investigation 
and meet several requirements under § 2705(b).  We agree.   
 
ABC Corp. concedes that the government asserts a 
compelling interest in preventing notice to the target of the 
investigation.  But ABC Corp. “misperceives the breadth of the 
compelling interest that underlies” the restriction on speech.48  
The government’s interest in grand jury secrecy is not limited 
to avoiding notification to the target.  The Supreme Court has 
identified several reasons to maintain grand jury secrecy:   
 
(1) To prevent the escape of those 
whose indictment may be 
contemplated; (2) to insure the 
utmost freedom to the grand jury in 
its deliberations, and to prevent 
persons subject to indictment or 
their friends from importuning the 
grand jurors; (3) to prevent 
subornation of perjury or 
tampering with the witness who 
may testify before [the] grand jury 
and later appear at the trial of those 
indicted by it; (4) to encourage free 
                                              
47 JA39, JA45 (citing § 2705(b)(2), (3), (5)). 
48 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 435 
(2015). 
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and untrammeled disclosures by 
persons who have information 
with respect to the commission of 
crimes; (5) to protect innocent 
accused who is exonerated from 
disclosure of the fact that he has 
been under investigation, and from 
the expense of standing trial where 
there was no probability of guilt.49   
To be sure, these reasons include avoiding consequences that 
might flow from alerting the target.  But the Supreme Court’s 
reasons additionally relate to the grand jury’s ability to freely 
deliberate, the desire for unfettered testimony by witnesses, 
and the protection of the target from the assumption of guilt.50  
Consistent with these concerns, § 2705(b) prohibits disclosure 
to “any other person” and not just to the target of the 
investigation.  Therefore, we must next consider whether the 
NDOs are narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means to 
preserve grand jury secrecy, not just whether the restriction 
avoids alerting the target of the investigation. 
 
                                              
49 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219 n.10 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 
681 n.6 (1958)). 
50 Id.; see also Sells Eng’g Inc., 463 U.S. at 424 (“Grand jury 
secrecy . . . is as important for the protection of the innocent as 
for the pursuit of the guilty.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  But see Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 634 
(“[R]eputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription 
of truthful speech.”). 
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2.  The Restriction on Speech is Narrowly Tailored. 
The District Court found that the NDOs are narrowly 
tailored because they are limited in time to one year.  ABC 
Corp. argues that time limitations are not enough to pass 
constitutional muster and that restrictions must be also be 
tailored in scope.  To this end, ABC Corp. characterizes the 
NDOs as a “total ban” on its speech.  We agree that a temporal 
limitation alone may not be enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.51  
The ban here is not, however, a total ban. 
 
Courts consistently distinguish between disclosure of 
information that a witness has independent of his participation 
in grand jury proceedings and information the witness learns 
as a result of his participation.52  This approach strikes a 
“balance” between First Amendment rights and the 
government’s “interests in preserving the confidentiality of its 
                                              
51 See United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 
2005) (“A prior restraint is not constitutionally inoffensive 
merely because it is temporary.”). 
52 Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632 (“[W]e deal only with 
respondent’s right to divulge information of which he was in 
possession before he testified before the grand jury, and not 
information which he may have obtained as a result of his 
participation in the proceedings of the grand jury.”); First 
Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 479 (holding that confidentiality 
requirement can prevent witnesses from disclosing 
proceedings, with the exception of their own testimony); see 
also Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34 (“[A] party may disseminate 
the identical information covered by the protective order as 
long as the information is gained through means independent 
of the court’s processes.”). 
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grand jury proceedings.”53  Here, the NDOs prohibit ABC 
Corp. only from speaking about the existence of the 
government’s requests—information it learned of by its 
participation as a grand jury witness.54  The NDOs do not 
prohibit ABC Corp. from discussing the government’s requests 
abstractly, as service providers have done by disclosing the 
number of data requests and NDOs they receive in public 
docket civil complaints.  This can hardly be described as a 
“total ban” on speech.  The NDOs only proscribe speech that 
would reveal the existence of this particular grand jury 
investigation to a non-participant, a measure narrowly tailored 
to preserve the secrecy of this grand jury proceeding. 
 
3.  The Restriction on Speech is the Least Restrictive 
Means of Advancing the Governmental Interest. 
ABC Corp. contends that the government can 
accomplish its compelling interest through less restrictive 
means.  “[I]f the Government could achieve its interests in a 
manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less 
speech, the Government must do so.”55  “When a plausible, less 
restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech 
restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the 
                                              
53 See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 630-31. 
54 See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] witness’[s] 
disclosure of the grand jury proceedings . . . is knowledge he 
acquires not ‘on his own’ but only by virtue of being made a 
witness.”). 
55 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 
(2002). 
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alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.”56  ABC 
Corp. proposes two alternatives:  (1) permission for it to notify 
the bankruptcy trustee of the subpoena; or (2) permission to 
notify the trustee of the subpoena without identifying the target 
email account, which according to ABC Corp., would prompt 
the trustee to seek more information from the District Court 
and enter into a protective order to restrict further 
dissemination.   
 
We agree with the government that these alternatives 
are untenable.  They are impractical and would be ineffective 
in maintaining grand jury secrecy.  Disclosure by an electronic 
service provider to a third party undermines the government’s 
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of an ongoing 
investigation.57  We cannot and will not assess the 
trustworthiness of a would-be confidante chosen by a service 
provider.  Simply put, “[w]e decline to wade into this swamp” 
of unworkable line drawing.58  Neither courts nor the 
government can be expected to vet individuals selected by 
service providers and determine their risk of subverting an 
                                              
56 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 816 
(2000). 
57 Cf. First Amendment Coal., 784 F.2d at 479 (“The 
confidentiality requirement is reasonable and may be enforced 
insofar as it would prevent a person [including a witness] . . . 
from disclosing proceedings taking place before the Board. . . 
.  The state interest in this respect, as in the grand jury setting, 
is sufficiently strong to support such a ban.”). 
58 Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 454. 
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ongoing investigation.  Strict scrutiny does not demand that 
sort of prognostication.59    
 
In sum, the NDOs’ gag effect remains the least 
restrictive means to maintain grand jury secrecy.   
 
III.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order by 
the District Court denying ABC Corp.’s motion to amend the 
nondisclosure orders. 
                                              
59 See id. (“The First Amendment requires that [a speech 
restriction] be narrowly tailored, not that it be ‘perfectly 
tailored.’”) (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 
(1992)). 
